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This special issue is a prime example of the difficulties faced in writing about moving 
targets. When the idea was conceived in 2014 , the Turkey-EU accession process 
seemed to be stuck in a post-Gezi Park rut and, as David Phinnemore and Erhan 
Icener say in their contribution to this special issue, not only had progress been 
“glacial” since 2005 the discourse surrounding it was dominated by words such as 
“impasse” and “stalemate” (2016). At that time, as co-editors, we were seeking to 
explain how the impasse had happened and why it was a missed opportunity for 
both Turkey and the European Union.  
Since that time, and since some of the articles included here were written, Turkey-
EU accession has been hit by two exogenous shocks which have changed the 
context in which it operates: the migration issue since mid-2015 and the attempted 
coup d’etat on July 15th 2016. The extreme political imperative on the EU’s elite 
actors to make the deals of November 2015 and March 2016, to stem the flow of 
people across the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece, appears to have obliged the 
EU to look selectively at Turkey’s record of liberal democracy. It has pledged to “re-
energise” the accession process even though Turkey’s Freedom House rating is 
currently 3.5 or “partly free” and its press freedom rating is even lower at “not free”1.  
The November deal was described by the former EU Ambassador in Ankara, Marc 
Pierini, as “realpolitik” at its worst2 as geostrategic pressure forced the EU to bend its 
previously immutable principles of liberal democracy. The July 2016 coup d’etat 
attempt has further stretched the credibility of any semblance of commitment to 
liberal democracy in Turkey with the wide scale “purging” of tens of thousands of 
alleged conspirators not only in the military but in education, the judiciary and the 
media3. Whether continuing migration will oblige the EU to bend its rules even 
further, and what the long term effect might be, are yet to be seen. What is clear 
however is that the landscape in which Turkey-EU accession is currently taking 
place has changed dramatically in the two years since this special issue project 
began.  
However, the co-editors contend that this actually adds weight to the argument that 
the stalemate reached soon after accession negotiations were opened in 2005 has 
been an opportunity missed. It has to be considered that this was a prime chance for 
the EU to continue to incentivise Turkey to carry out liberal constitutional reform. It 
must also be considered that Turkey may not have become as illiberal if accession 
had remained a viable option. A more liberal democratic Turkey may even have 
stopped the migration issue becoming a crisis which required such a “realpolitik”-
driven response. 
Phinnemore and Icener look at the reasons why the door to Turkey is not closed but 
progress remains only at a “snail’s pace”. It concentrates on the EU side of events 
and explores how the EU has engaged with Turkey and how Turkey-EU relations fit 
into the wider enlargement dynamic. It identifies five variables for closer examination: 
integration capacity, member state preferences, public opinion, supranational 
activism and the ongoing enlargement narrative. This comparative approach 
highlights that Turkey has proceeded more slowly than other comparable accession 
states and argues that Turkey’s lack of progress cannot therefore be simply put 
down to wider enlargement fatigue. 
It does concede that the Turkish case has been caught up in a wider desire to 
tighten the conditionality involved and to place more emphasis on chapters 23 
(judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security). Hence 
Phinnemore and Icener conclude that: “The outlook for Turkey’s membership bid is 
far from rosy, and this is before consideration is given to the commitment of the 
Turkish government to the process and its capacity to implement the necessary 
reforms” (2016). However, they do add that the door for Turkey remains at least half 
open and has been “re-energised” by the migration issue.  
 
Ebru Turhan’s paper also looks at member state preferences and their influence on 
EU policy towards Turkey. It pays particular attention to the preferences and 
positions of the so-called ‘Big Three’ (Germany, France, and the UK), as well as 
Greece and Cyprus. The paper provides a useful historical overview of Ankara’s 
relations with the EU since 1997 giving the reader a glimpse of the ebbs and flows in 
the relationship and the role of member state preferences within that. Turhan 
highlights that before 1999 the UK was an advocate of Turkish accession mostly for 
geostrategic reasons. However the Turkish case was opposed by the Franco-
German axis within the EU until 1999 and also, crucially, Greece and Cyprus. The 
attitude of Greece then shifted in 1999 in exchange for pay-offs in the Cypriot case. 
However the Cypriot factor re-emerged after accession negotiations were opened in 
2005 and was instrumental in leading to the impasse and the blocking of numerous 
chapters thereafter. Turhan points out that Cyprus would probably not have been 
able to do this if its stance was not also backed by the French and German 
governments of the time. 
 
More recently there have been moves to recharge the accession process with 
Turkey most notably after the departure of Sarkozy from the Elysee Palace and the 
election of Francois Hollande as President in France. However this was low key and 
very much hindered by growing illiberality in Turkey exemplified by the Gezi Park 
protests in 2013. It was not until the migration issue of 2015 that there was the 
political will in Berlin and Paris to properly “re-energise” the process. The potential 
political cost for Angela Merkel of the migration issue in late 2015 meant she was 
willing to make concessions to Turkey in order to secure a deal. Whilst Cyprus has 
continued to express reservations about the deal and to oppose the opening of some 
more significant chapters of the acquis, these developments demonstrate the 
continuing significance of member state preferences in the Turkey-EU accession 
process.  
 
Isabel David’s contribution to this special issue is to argue that progress towards EU 
accession was always dependent on its compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
and therefore, after, 2002, was in the hands of the AKP. Moreover the paper argues 
that the AKP never intended to democratise and used the EU instrumentally to 
consolidate its political power base within Turkey. In other words, the AKP took a 
strategic attitude to democratisation in accordance with an application of Rational 
Choice theory. It was a rational choice to use EU accession as a vote-winner in the 
first place and then to use conditionality instrumentally in order to bolster its own 
position. For example, reform of civil military relations were a particularly important 
part of EU conditionality which were stressed repeatedly in the European 
Commission’s annual progress reports. However the military were also a crucial part 
of the political establishment’s opposition to the AKP and Erdogan’s party was able 
to use EU “norms” to clip the political wings of the military. 
 
David utilises a number of hypotheses to reach these conclusions. She argues that 
whilst the EU is influential in democratisation (and Europeanisation) this is less likely 
to happen in a political system with a dominant political party. The AKP has won 
every election since 2002 and can be considered as such. The paper argues that 
this was because democratisation would increase the plurality of the political system 
and thereby create political opponents. Moreover, David contends that 
democratisation is less likely in a country, like Turkey, with deep cleavages in socio-
economic, ethnic and religious terms. Lastly, the paper theorises that the dominant 
party will use existing institutions to consolidate a power base and ultimately that 
democratisation will depend on the underlying inclination and motivation of the 
political actors in question.  
Hence, the paper argues that the AKP used EU reforms to limit the powers of those 
actors that had previously sought to restrict political Islam in Turkey whilst stepping 
back from “reforms in areas liable of producing resistance to its dominant status or 
even of threatening that status” (David 2016). Hence she argues that the reason for 
the impasse in Turkey-EU relations is less the fault of the EU and its failing 
conditionality credibility and more the result of strategic democratisation by the AKP. 
Gulay Icoz’s paper proposes two important questions: Why there has not been a 
significant progress in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. How useful is historical 
institutionalism in assessing whether the issues that shaped Turkey–EU relations 
pre-2005 continue to effect Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU 
after 2005?  Through study of the history of Turkey–EU relations, using the Factiva 
database and surveying the existing academic literature, Icoz shows that over time 
two path dependent issues have been most effective not only in the development of 
Turkey-EU relations between 1959 and 2005, but also in the EU accession 
negotiations.  
The first is what she calls ‘external and internal actors’ interference with the functions 
of government’. By which she argues that there is good evidence that in Turkish 
politics independence of the bodies of the government have been undermined by the 
dominant presence and active role of i) external actors or Turkish armed forces (for 
they are not a branch of government) or ii) internal actors or President Erdogan (for it 
is a branch of government). According to Icoz this ultimately made it difficult for the 
Turkish authorities to meet the democratic credentials of the EU, and hindered the 
implementation of the necessary EU reforms. The relationship between Turkey and 
the EU was problematised both before and after Turkey began the accession 
negotiations.  
The second is Turkey’s long-standing Cypriot and Kurdish problems. The ways in 
which the Turkish authorities have dealt with them have repeatedly affected Turkey’s 
accession negotiations. Since the Cypriot and the Kurdish 
problems have not been resolved in the way the EU expected, no significant 
progress was made in Turkey’s pursuit to join the EU. Finally, Icoz argues that these 
two issues are path dependent because they continuously contribute to the 
development and progress of the relationship. As for the future of Turkey-EU 
relations, Icoz predicts that unless Turkish authorities can reverse the path 
dependent issues she highlights in her article, Turkey’s accession negotiations will 
continue to fluctuate and be inconclusive, regardless of the EU’s need for Turkey’s 
help on the refugee crisis.  
In this way the special issue has provided several perspectives on how the Turkey-
EU accession process has been a series of missed opportunities since 2005. It has 
also offered explanations as to why this may have happened: member state 
preferences, strategic action by the AKP government and security issues at home 
and in the near abroad of Turkey. It proffers a suggestion as to the consequences of 
these missed opportunities. As outlined above, in the years after 2005 the EU 
missed the chance to keep Turkey on the path to democratisation and Ankara has 
since diverged far from it. This has obliged the EU to deal with an unpredictable 
neighbour and ally over migration and also, we must not forget, over the situation in 
Syria and Ukraine. This has obliged the EU to deviate from norms and values which 
were previously very influential on its policymaking. The ultimate consequences of 
this divergence, from liberal democratic normative values, are yet to be seen.  
Hence, this issue contributes not only a fresh approach to the study of Turkey-EU 
relations since 2005, but it is also a timely study of why Turkey is not a member of 
the EU in 2016 – more than a decade after accession negotiations began. Finally, it 
also carries on the work of Professor Chris Rumford of Royal Holloway College, 
University of London — who passed away in August 2016. Chris edited a special 
issue of JCES on Turkey-EU relations in 2011 and was a great inspiration to us. We 
hope this continues Chris’s work in the field and would like to dedicate the special 
issue to him. 
*This special issue is the result of the panel 'Turkey and the EU - ten years on from 
Brussels 2004' at the UACES 44th Annual Conference, 1-3 September 2014, Cork, 
Eire. 
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1 See: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey 
2 Pierini quoted in Agence France Presse, November 30th 2015, Less to Turkey-EU deal than meets the eye: 
analysts 
3 Agence France Presse, September 2nd 2016, Over 10,000 sacked in new Turkey post-coup purge 
